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ABSTRACT
The home has been lifted to a special pantheon of rights and
protections in American constitutional law. Until recently, a conception
of special protections for the home in the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause was under-addressed by scholars. However, a contemporary and
robust academic treatment of a home-centric takings doctrine merits a
different approach to construction and interpretation: the intratextual
and intradoctrinal implications of a coherent set of homebound
protections across the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause.
Intratextualism and intradoctrinalism are interpretive methods of
juxtaposing non-adjoining and adjoining clauses in the Constitution and
Supreme Court doctrines to find patterns of meaning in words and
jurisprudence. Applying these methodological exercises to the first five
amendments in the Bill of Rights reveals deeper thematic connections
among the textual and doctrinal protections to the home. This crosspollination of constitutional clauses and doctrines also offers scholars
and jurists normative doctrines to provide greater protections to homes
beyond the traditional protections that have existed for decades under
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law scholars and jurists frequently engage in textual
and doctrinal methods of constitutional construction. This is well
recognized in constitutional law literature, but scholars have paid little
attention to or engaged in these methods of interpretation with regard
to the “constitutional home.”1 A textual and doctrinal thread of
homebound protections runs through the first five amendments,
delineating the home as a place worthy of special constitutional
protections. However, there is a distinct chasm. The Bill of Rights
extends special protections to homes in rights that cover smut, guns,
soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination, but those same protections do
not extend to takings.2
In recent scholarship, I argued that the story behind the absence of
a special protection to homes in the Takings Clause is partly due to the
Supreme Court’s adherence, particularly in its public use doctrine, to
1. See generally Gerald S. Dickinson, The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home, 80 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1099 (2020).
2. Id. at 1100.
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deferential standards in substantive economic due process. But the
Court has applied strict scrutiny standards for fundamental rights,
including privacy rights that involve the home as a zone of protection.3
However, this explanation is unpersuasive as to why the Supreme
Court should, normatively, extend the homebound protections to its
takings doctrine. Thus, the absence of a homebound takings doctrine
calls for an application of coherence theory to carve out a special
protection doctrine for the home under the Takings Clause.4 All else
being equal, scholars and the Supreme Court could, and arguably
should, as a matter of coherence theory, extend the home-centric
doctrinal thread of special protections to cover homes in takings.5 This
Article advances this thesis by engaging in intratextual and
intradoctrinal methods of constitutional interpretation to crosspollinate various homebound protections across the Bill of Rights.
Akhil Amar has noted that protections to the home under the
Constitution were largely a result of the post-Reconstruction era,
where the Third Amendment bridged a “home-centric Second
Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from the beginning
protective of the private domain.”6 Indeed, an intratextual and
intradoctrinal approach to homebound protections within the Bill of
Rights—“done correctly”—provides scholars and jurists a deeper
appreciation of and understanding for protections of the “home” than
analyzing the Court’s analysis of each amendment separately.7 This
methodological exercise reveals intriguing patterns of related
protections between different homebound protections in the Bill of
Rights, while at the same time exposing deeper thematic associations
of protections to the home within the Bill of Rights and normative
arguments for expanding protections to the home.
I. INTERPRETIVE METHODS TO THE DOCUMENT AND DOCTRINE
Textualism and doctrinalism have long competed for the laurel as
the superior method of constitutional interpretation.8 While textualism

3. Id. at 1104.
4. Id. at 1103.
5. Id.
6. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 267 (1998).
7. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
“Intratextualism”, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 771 (2000).
8. See generally PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982) (proposing six modalities of interpretation, including historical, textual,
doctrinal, prudential, structural and ethical). Although the traditional interpretive methods
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is resurgent in constitutional and statutory interpretation,9 doctrinalism
still maintains a foothold as the predominant method of
interpretation.10 Intratextualism may provide a more coherent and
harmonized conception of the sanctity of the home across the Bill of
Rights.11 However, a more holistic examination of the Bill of Rights
offers greater clarity and coherence to the Court’s distinctive
protection to the home, but also its inexplicable absence of such
protections in takings. For example, textually relying upon the
“writtenness” of the home is an incomplete treatment of home-centric
interpretations across the Bill of Rights. Thus, we would be remiss not
to engage with doctrinalism—or intradoctrinalism—to resolve the
dilemma.12
include text, history, structure, prudence, and doctrine, I chose to focus the methodological
framework on textualism and doctrinalism, as both are primary methods and the former
encompasses, for the most part, “structural” and “historical” methods that aim to “mine as much
meaning as possible from the Constitution itself,” or who Akhil Reed Amar refers to as
“documentarians.” See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 30 (2000) (arguing that these “readings are
documentarian”).
9. See generally Abbe Gluck, The State as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
(examining how state courts have experimented with giving stare decisis effect to methodologies
of statutory interpretation); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA.
L. REV. 157 (2018) (highlighting how textualist U.S. Supreme Court Justices have been willing to
abandon stare decisis); John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287
(2010); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that
while textualism has a strong foothold in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court’s approach to
preemption still tends to fundamentally purposive); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237 (2017) (arguing that textualism has seen a
resurgence in in statutory interpretation including in interpreting civil rights statutes); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010) (highlighting Philip P.
Frickey’s work examining the “empirical foundations of early textualism); Jennifer Nou,
Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81 (2015) (arguing that judges should take a textualist
approach to regulatory interpretation); John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle
Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369 (2013) (highlighting the tension between the “new textualism”
and obstacle preemption); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism:
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121 (2016)
(asserting that Supreme Court Justices have used a combination of textualism with pragmatism
to mold decisions based on ideological preferences); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011) (documenting the rise
of “new textualism”, its significance, and work that remains to be done).
10. See David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (indicating that “constitutional law resembles the common law much more
closely than it resembles a text-based system”).
11. Vermeule & Young, supra note 7, at 771. See Amar, supra note 8, at 30. It matters little,
as Ahkil Amar explains, whether we label such interpretive methods “textual,” “structural,” or
“historical.” These interpretations are, at the end of the day, “documentarian” in that they seek
meaning directly from the Constitution. Id.
12. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV 747, 747–48, 796 (1999)
[hereinafter Amar’s Intratextualism].
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A. Intratextualists and Textualism
Some scholars have argued that the Constitution’s Bill of Rights
has not been “studied holistically,” and instead has been “broken up
into discrete blocks of text, with each segment examined in isolation.”13
One methodological approach is what Amar coins as “intratextualism”;
that is, using the Constitution as a concordance to identify patterns
across the first five Bill of Rights.14 This type of concordance
intratextualism enables and encourages scholars to “place
nonadjoining clauses alongside each other for analysis because [the
clauses] use the same (or very similar) words and phrases.”15 This
approach of interpreting noncontiguous and contiguous amendments
reveals “deeper thematic connection[s],” and is particularly useful in
understanding home-centric protections.16
At its core, intratextualism is a method for understanding the
meaning of certain words, provisions, and clauses in the Constitution by
comparing “various words and phrases” that recur throughout the
document.17 The goal is to find meaning. The interpreter attempts to
“read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in
light of another passage . . . featuring the same (or very similar) word
or phrase.”18 This, Amar argues, is a necessary supplement to the
traditional constitutional interpretive methods, such as “text, history,
structure, prudence, and doctrine.”19 In other words, if scholars—and
jurists especially—parse the “text of a given clause[,]” they can find
meaning and patterns that lead to conclusions about the intent of the
Framers or the meaning of a particular provision.20 Intratextualism also
considers parallel provisions in light of their text, history, and
precedent, and seeks illumination by comparing the two provisions.21
An intratextualist approach to the Constitution by interpreters
requires an eye towards “consistency rather than inconsistency.”22 As

13. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 78 at XI.
(1998). This is not an endorsement of Amar’s “intratextualism” per se, but instead simply an
application of an interpretative methodology that is useful to examine the chasm in homebound
protections between the Takings Clause and the rest of the Bill of Rights.
14. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 792–93.
15. Id. at 793.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 747–48.
18. Id. at 748.
19. Id. at 754.
20. Id.
21. Vermeule & Young, supra note 7, at 739.
22. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 794.
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many will argue, it is difficult to find “any single, coherent scheme of
principle”23 under the Constitution, but intratextualism attempts to do
so.
Amar’s famous example of intratextualism is his analysis of Justice
Marshall’s “intriguing methodological turn” in McCulloch v.
Maryland.24 There, Justice Marshall referenced several provisions in the
Constitution, effectively using the document itself as a dictionary to
define “necessary” and “absolutely necessary.” In doing so, Amar
explains that Justice Marshall concluded that “absolutely necessary”
was used by the Framers to convey “necessity,” and therefore
“necessary” under Article I, Section 8 does not implicitly mean the
same as the strict meaning of “necessity.”25
Another example is Amar’s parsing of Article V. The provision
states that Congress is empowered “whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary”26 to suggest changes to the
Constitution. Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause states that
Congress shall “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Executive the foregoing Powers.”27 And then, again, in
Article II, Section 3, the Constitution gives the President the power to
recommend to Congress “such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient.”28 Later in the text, Article IV, Section 3 states that
Congress has the power to “make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States.”29
Amar’s “intratextualism” views the Constitution as its own
dictionary, and holds that similar words could and should be
interpreted the same way. If the reader (or judge) is unsure of the
meaning behind “necessary” or “proper,” then she could pull out the
internal dictionary that is the Constitution, scan its pages to find the
same word, and then interpret that same word the same way as (or
differently than) it has been interpreted by other judges in similar (or
not so similar) factual and legal circumstances.30 If intratextualism is
23. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 217, 229 (1986).
24. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see also Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note
12, at 756.
25. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 757.
26. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 788.
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done “modestly,” such a method may have benefits that outweigh the
burdens or liabilities.31
Yet, the text of the Constitution “routinely . . . has very little to do
with the way the case is argued or decided,” and instead “resembles the
common law much more closely than it resembles a text-based
system.”32 The Court’s opinions are atextual in nature and more
reminiscent of “purposivist and precedent-based interpretive
methodologies.”33 But “intratextualism often merely provides an
interpretive lead or clue” that cannot be fully understood until scholars
and jurists employ additional interpretive tools.”34
B. Doctrinalists and Doctrinalism
This Article leans simultaneously on both “documentarians”35 and
“doctrinalists” to study how a homebound “takings” doctrine—as
explored in prior scholarship36—might inform normative protections to
homes in other adjacent and nonadjacent amendments across the Bill
of Rights.37 While documentarians look to the “specific words and word
patterns, [and] the historical experiences that birthed and rebirthed the
text,”38 doctrinalists do not rely strictly upon the text, history, and
structure of the Constitution. Rather, they “strive to synthesize what
the Supreme Court has said and done, sometimes rather loosely, in the
name of the Constitution.”39 An interpreter who utilizes doctrinalism

31. Id. at 738.
32. Strauss, supra note 10, at 4.
33. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1241 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709 (1975)); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 921 (1996) (noting how the Establishment
Clause and Warrant Clause have been interpreted in purposivist ways that are at odds with the
original understanding of the text).
34. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 771.
35. Examples of such interpreters include Justice Hugo Black, Dean John Hart Ely, and
Professors Steven Calabresi and Douglas Laycock. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 26.
36. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1099.
37. See infra Part III.
38. AMAR, supra note 6, at 26.
39. Id. Notable doctrinalists include Justice Harlan, Dean Kathleen Sullivan, Professor
Richard Fallon and Professor David Strauss. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 26; see also Bruce
Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5
(1991) (arguing that Harlan sought to “revitalize common law constitutionalism”); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 54 (1997) (assessing the content, role, and process of Supreme Court doctrine); Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE. L.J. 1119 (1995) (arguing that Supreme
Court doctrine is fundamentally based on understandings of democracy); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term–Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992) (highlighting the surprisingly moderate nature of the 1991 term shedding light on
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replaces the enacted text with “elaborate precedent.”40 Those who
“privilege precedent concede that the text does sometimes matter.”41
But, by utilizing doctrinalism alongside intratextualism, one might
argue that “[j]udicial doctrines, working alongside [other] rules . . .
properly fill in the document’s outline, making broad principles
workably specific in a court and in the world.”42 This approach
acknowledges that the document requires the “crafting of doctrine by
courts.”43 Likewise, interpreting the Constitution is similar to the Court
utilizing common law doctrinal principles to flesh out meaning.44
With the methodological framework of this Article laid out, let us
proceed to revisit the Court’s homebound doctrines that involve smut,
guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination using intratextualism
and intradoctrinalism as interpretive tools.45 I will then proceed to
identify and discuss the lack of protections to the home under the
Takings Clause, and then advocate for a homebound limitation in
takings as a matter of harmony and consistency.46
II. THE HOMEBOUND BILL OF RIGHTS
The Constitution and the Supreme Court have created a textual
and doctrinal schism within the Bill of Rights that, until recently, was
left unaddressed.47 Over decades, the Court has granted special
protections to a zone of privacy within the home but has failed to
extend similar protections to the home in its takings doctrine.48
Take, for example, the First Amendment. In Stanley v. Georgia, the
Court noted that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch.”49 This is an
the connection between rules and standards); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (vigorously defending the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions).
40. AMAR, supra note 6, at 27.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 79.
43. Fallon, supra note 39, at 57.
44. See Strauss, supra note 33, at 877–79 (arguing that textualism and originalism are
inadequate models for constitutional law, but rather the common-law approach “restrains judges
more effectively”).
45. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1099.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See Dickinson, supra note 1.
48. Id.
49. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); see also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,
142 (1973) (“The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it
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atextual treatment of the homebound protections—a precise and
express protection to the home is not evident in the text of the First
Amendment.
Likewise, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court found a
constitutionally-protected individual right to bear arms in the “hearth
and home.”50 This atextual reading of the Second Amendment left
many wondering the value and import of structure and textual
interpretations of the Second Amendment.51 Yet, adjoining the Second
Amendment is the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering
soldiers in the home during peacetime. This rarely studied amendment
has raised significant questions regarding its utility and original intent.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court gave credence to
the Third Amendment’s textual prohibition of quartering soldiers in a
home during peace time, noting that “in many parts of the world, a
military commander can seize private housing to shelter his troops. Not
so, however, in the United States.”52
Similarly, the adjacent Fourth Amendment textually protects the
home, giving “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.53 The Court has noted
that “the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”54 Even in the criminal
procedure clause of the Fifth Amendment there exists an atextual
protection of the home. The Court has peered across the Bill of Rights
to the Fourth Amendment to find a homebound protection in
compulsory exhortation of a person’s testimony when the home is
unlawfully entered and searched by law enforcement.55 The Court has

protects other special privacy rights.”); Moreno v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310,
314 (D.D.C. 1972) (“Recent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that even the states, which
possess a great police power not granted to Congress, cannot in the name of morality infringe the
rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home.”).
50. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 615–16, 635 (2008) (explaining that the
founding generation supported “every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them in his
house, his castle, for his own defense”).
51. See id. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the basis for finding the use of arms
for self-defense purposes as the core of the Second Amendment right).
52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment protects
the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”).
55. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“The principles laid down in this
opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case then before the court.”).
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noted that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run “almost into each
other”56 and that the protections “apply to all invasions . . . of the
sanctity of a man’s home and privacies of life”57 when “[b]reaking into
a house . . . .”58 But when arriving at the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause, no such protections to or within the home exist.
In Kelo v. New London, the Court found that the seizure of homes
for economic development purposes was justifiable.59 Unlike the Third
and Fourth Amendments, the Fifth Amendment does not textually
impose any special protections on homes. But like the First and Second
Amendments and the criminal procedure clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Takings Clause does not doctrinally provide for a
special protection to the home. However, a close reading of Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Kelo raises the prospect that the Court could, in
limited circumstances, provide for special protections to homes in
takings.60
There, Justice Thomas noted that the Court has “elsewhere [in the
Fourth Amendment] recognized ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity
of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic.’”61 He implicitly referenced the special protections to
the home as a zone of privacy in the First, Second and Fourth
Amendments by noting that “[t]hough citizens are safe from the
government in their homes, the homes themselves [in takings] are
not.”62 He then focused his argument for a lack of homebound
protection in takings on the Fourth Amendment, explaining that “[w]e
would not defer to a legislature’s determination of the various
circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home
would be reasonable,” because we have recognized the “overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home.”63
The Court has failed to embrace Justice Thomas’s plea for a more
rigorous judicial review of takings where homes are subject to seizure.
However, as argued in recent scholarship, the logical doctrinal step is
for the Court to embrace coherence theory as a guiding principle for
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
60. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103 (explaining why the absence of home-centric takings
protection is notable).
61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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invoking a home-centric takings doctrine.64 Doing so would close the
schism in the special protections to the home.65 This seems logical.
Scholars and jurists strive for coherence. The practice of achieving
harmony in text and doctrine requires scholars and jurists to identify
“patterns of influence and adjustment” and then reason their way to a
coherent outcome.66 Thus, intratextual and intradoctrinal methods of
interpretation reveal a pattern of jurisprudential influence by the
Supreme Court that carves out a variety of interpretive tools to find a
zone of protections in the home in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments, except for the Takings Clause. This pattern of
coherence strongly suggests that the Court could, and arguably should,
in limited circumstances, achieve coherence in takings by applying
special protections homes that are subject to expropriation or
overregulation.67

64. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103 (“[I]f the Fourth Amendment provides protections
to homes (albeit within the zone of privacy), then it would seem that, as a matter of consistency
and symmetry, the Court should likewise extend similar special protections to homes[.]”).
65. Id. Writing about this schism:
Constitutional congruence of home protections offers a comprehensive vision of the
sanctity of the home in the Bill of Rights that embraces consistency and predictability.
This constitutional congruence, in other words, offers a pragmatic mode of
interpretation that harmonizes the home consistently in between and across all five
amendments, including the Takings Clause. The addition of homebound protections in
takings would further allow scholars and jurists to contemplate the home not solely
through the lens of an “individual line of constitutional text” as if bound to, say, the
Third or Fourth Amendment. Rather, pursuing home protections in the Takings Clause
harmonizes home-centric doctrines in the Bill of Rights as a whole. This is achieved by
doing two things at once: inferring the “home’s constitutional primacy from the
structure and context of the document itself,” and subsequently drawing parallels to the
sanctity of the home by leaning on precedent and doctrine from other doctrines within
the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 1136.
66. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1241 (1987).
67. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103. I have proposed a homebound takings doctrine that
would include special protection tests and doctrines to homes under the Nollan and Dolan meansend tests in the public use context, the Penn Central burden per se burden shifting test, the Lucas
categorical test and Loretto’s temporary physical invasion tests. For example, in an eminent
domain proceeding where a home is subject to condemnation, the Court could theoretically
employ the Nollan and Dolan exactions heightened scrutiny tests to technically require the
condemning municipality to rationally relate the means by which the government acquires
property to the specific public purpose where homes are threatened by condemnation. In other
words, the proof standard would require the government to demonstrate a connection between
the taking of a home and the specific public purpose for the taking. Likewise, a homebound
protection under the Court’s takings doctrine would specially protect homes if a regulation
affected the economic value of the home. For example, special just compensation formulas, or
above fair market values, would be granted to homeowners whose property is impacted. Under
the Court’s Lucas test, a homebound doctrine might invalidate a regulation if it reduced the

DICKINSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

302

4/17/2020 12:02 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 15

III. METHODOLOGICAL & DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
COHERENT HOMEBOUND BILL OF RIGHTS
A harmonized, home-centric Bill of Rights reveals profound
interdependence and relational connections within and across
homebound doctrines in ways scholars have not addressed by
employing intratextual and intradoctrinal modes of interpretation. To
read the Court’s homebound doctrines as just one “individual line of
constitutional text” within each amendment68 distracts jurists and
scholars from the normative prescriptions that the home could, and
arguably should, be granted greater protections across the Bill of
Rights as a whole, including the Takings Clause.69
Bridging various home-centric amendments “can help identify
additional aspects of holistic constitutional reasonableness,” such as
property protections.70 These interpretive combinations are useful for
deeper understandings of the utility of home-protection doctrines
across the Bill of Rights, because “[s]ometimes the home’s
constitutional preeminence is express” while at other times the Court
has “inferred the home’s constitutional primacy from the structure and
context of the document itself.”71 When we juxtapose the various
protections to homes in adjoining and non–adjoining clauses, we find
potentially new doctrines to provide greater protections to homes that
were previously unaddressed.
A. Smut, Guns and Searches
Juxtaposing the adjoining and non–adjoining First, Second, and
Fourth Amendment doctrines involving smut, guns, and searches brings
a fresh perspective to the atextual nature of the Court’s homebound
doctrine.

market value of the home by some specified percentage, as opposed to Lucas’s test of “all
economically viable use.” If the regulation deprived the homeowner of even less than all
economically viable use of the property, the regulations would either be struck down or the
homeowner would be entitled to specially calculated just compensation. Lastly, a homebound
protection under the Fifth Amendment might employ the Loretto test if the “character of the
governmental action” is a temporary instead of a permanent physical occupation or invasion of
the home.
68. Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1305 (2009).
69. Michal C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 232 (2008).
70. AMAR, supra note 6, at 79.
71. Miller, supra note 68, at 1304.
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Recall Stanley v. Georgia. Some members of the Court focused their
review of the underlying action on its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, yet Stanley was a case that dealt strictly with lewd
material in the home. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart honed in on
the Fourth Amendment—rather than the First—as the primary
constitutional inquiry before the Court, noting that the presence of the
agents in the “house” with warrants made the search and seizure valid,
but did not permit the agents to seize the obscene material.72 The Court
was able depart doctrinally from its earlier rulings finding obscenity
unprotected under the First Amendment by making the distinction that
the prior rulings dealt with obscenity in public, whereas the locus at
issue in Stanley was a private home.73 Perhaps the Court in Stanley was
“influenced by an appreciation of our society’s traditional connection
between one’s home and one’s sense of autonomy and personhood.”74
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller, on the other hand, makes a non–
adjoining intradoctrinal connection as opposed to intratextual one, by
tracking the First and Fourth Amendments in justifying the Court’s
position on bearing arms in the home. He stated that like the First and
Fourth Amendments—each of which respectively protect modern
forms of communications and searches—the Second extends to all
instruments that constitute “bearable arms, even those that were not in
existence at the time of the founding.”75 Justice Scalia further
illustrated the connection between the First and Second Amendment,
arguing that “just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect
the right of citizens to speak for any purpose,” the Court does not read
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to “carry arms
for any sort of confrontation.”76 Then, to add the Fourth Amendment
to the mix and draw an extended link between constitutional
amendments, Justice Scalia stated that the First and Second (and Third)
Amendments “codified a pre–existing right.”77
It is clear that Justice Scalia—inadvertently perhaps—extended the
Court’s obsession with protections to the “home” to the Second
Amendment by relying upon the First and Fourth Amendments

72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
73. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (finding obscenity “not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech”).
74. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 57 (1993).
75. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
76. Id. at 595.
77. Id. at 591.
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protections. For an originalist (arguably textualist78) such as Scalia, it
seems that “even the best documentarian reading must sometimes
yield in court to brute facts born of earlier judicial and political
deviations.”79 When homes are at the center of a constitutional dispute,
textualists simply may be “ill-equipped to be good documentarians.”80
Perhaps this is a good thing, but as Amar has argued, the law might also
be worse off if all the Justices engaged in pure textualism.81
Putting aside the Fourth Amendment for a moment, it does seem
that the Second Amendment is the “equivalent of our coming to know
the First Amendment.”82 But this raises a few problems doctrinally.
Justice Scalia did not seem to recognize that if obscenity is protected
inside the home, but not outside the home, then why should the right
to bear arms outside the home have greater protections? It is arguably
the case that the Heller Court “sent unmistakable signals that the First
and Second Amendments are cousins and may be subject to similar
limitations.”83
Indeed, “[o]utside the home, the undirected, unauthorized bearing
of firearms by individuals simply is not the bearing of arms in the
Second Amendment sense, any more than obscenity outside the home
is speech in the First Amendment sense.”84 Juxtaposing these two
amendments in light of Justice Scalia’s doctrinal somersaults shows the
difficulty of interpreting adjoining amendments within the Bill of
Rights regarding homes. Similar to obscenity, “it is the home that
mediates not only the constitutional purpose, but the constitutional
meaning of these textual provisions.”85 Sometimes the Court must go
beyond identifying meaning and instead engage in implementation of
the Second Amendment by crafting doctrine that is driven by the
Constitution but is not directly reflective of its meaning. As Miller
notes, this is exactly what Justice Scalia achieved in reading into the
Second Amendment jurisprudence a right to bear arms in “hearth and
78. Michael P. Healy, The Claims and Limits of Justice Scalia’s Textualism: Lessons from his
Statutory Standing Decisions, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2861, 2867 (2019) (“Beginning in the 1980s,
Justice Scalia emerged as the leading advocate of the textualist approach to the interpretation of
statutes.”).
79. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 28.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (1991).
83. Miller, supra note 68, at 1304.
84. Id. at 1320–21.
85. Id. at 1321.
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home.”86 Indeed, as Miller says, a “person who feels truly at liberty from
government or private threats only when he strolls about the streets
with bandoliers and a machine gun . . . is much like the person who feels
truly at liberty only when he scans obscene magazines on a public park
bench.”87 This, as Miller explains, is not constitutionally-protected
activity.
Inserting the Court’s smut doctrine into the Court’s gun doctrine
would seem to be simple, because the latter right, like the former, is a
right that, in some instances, “ends at the doorstep.”88 If the
government, by way of the First Amendment, “can regulate obscenity”
in public spaces to “protect the health and welfare of the populace”
then arguably, as Miller notes, the government should be able to do the
same with firearms.89 Doing so views the regulation of firearms in
public no different than the regulation of lewd material in public.90
Smut, guns, and searches, when commingled and cross-pollinated, show
how intradoctrinalism and intratextualism work in tandem to shed light
on underexplored themes in constitutional law.
B. Seizing Guns
The Court’s ruling in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago noted that
governments must compensate owners when property is taken for a
public use.91 This rule, embedded in due process doctrine, extends to
compensating property owners when property is destroyed or reduced
in value for a public purpose.92 However, as the Court noted in Miller
v. Schoene, the government may also destroy a class of property for the
purpose of promoting public values.93
One obvious parallel in seizures of personal property deemed the
antithesis of the public good is alcohol. In the Court’s pre-Lochner era
ruling in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court made a distinction between its
police power and takings power by permitting the destruction of
property for a justifiable public good.94 There, the Court drew a fine

86. Id. at 1351.
87. Id. at 1352.
88. Id. at 1299.
89. Id. at 1300.
90. Id.
91. 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
92. Robert A. O’Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira, An Uncertain Right: The Second Amendment
and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 179, 200 (1992).
93. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (emphasis added).
94. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
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parallel between the prohibition era practice of destroying alcohol for
the public good—an exercise of the police power—and takings. Robert
A. O’Hare, Jr. and Jorge Pedreira note that if the government exercises
its police powers to destroy personal property, such as alcohol, then
such logic may extend to destroying confiscated guns for the public
benefit or public good of health and safety.95 Indeed, this would extend
to regulations affecting firearms and physical confiscation of such
firearms. The argument is buttressed by state legislatures that have
viewed bans on assault weapons specifically as justifiable under police
power prerogatives of protecting public safety.96 Private property that
is deemed a public nuisance, such as guns, could plausibly avoid takings
scrutiny if the purpose of the state action is to protect the health, safety,
and general welfare of the public. Indeed, restrictions on manufacture
and sale of machine guns or temporary suspensions on importing
assault weapons have not been found to be takings.97
Likewise, regulations that require peaceable surrender, lawful
disposition, or lawful removal of a firearm may arguably be a lawful
exercise of the legislature’s police power instead of eminent domain.98
In fact, some courts have upheld ordinances that have limited
geographic reach, in which restrictions were placed on firearms, but
owners could still sell or dispose of their firearms beyond the municipal
boundaries, thus negating any taking because the regulation did not
destroy the use and enjoyment of the firearm completely.99 However,
that doctrinal calculus may change if the state focused its police power
95. O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 92, at 201.
96. Id.; see also Hyde v. City of Birmingham, 392 So. 2d 1226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)
(forbidding by ordinance public possession of certain weapons under circumstance where natural
tendency of such possession would be to provoke breach of the peace); Matthews v. State, 148
N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958) (requiring by statute procurement of a license to carry certain firearms
except in person’s abode or fixed place of business); People v. McFadden, 188 N.W.2d 141 (Mich.
App. 1971) (requiring by statute license to carry a concealed weapon); State v. Robinson, 343
P.2d 886 (Or. 1959) (forbidding by statute a person who has been convicted of a felony from
having in his possession or under his custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed
upon the person); Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 668 P.2d 596 (Wash. 1983)
(limiting by ordinance possession of firearms where alcoholic beverages are sold); Carfield v.
State, 649 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1982) (forbidding by statute the use or possession of a firearm by one
who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to certain crime).
97. See Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 869 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that temporary
suspensions are not takings after considering the nature of the regulation and its economic
impact); Akins v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619, 622 (2008) (holding that the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ designation of, and restrictions on, machine guns were an
exercise of police power).
98. Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 865–66 (D.C. 1979) (upholding a police department’s
decision to deny registration for guns with particular level of fire power).
99. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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to force the surrender, disposition, or removal of a firearm stored or
possessed in the home. A home-centric takings doctrine would then
become relevant.
The government does, in limited circumstances, seize guns as an
exercise of its police power for the health, safety, and general welfare
of the public. Such an ordinance, for example, could ban assault
weapons in public and in private residences, specifically homes, due to
the concern that such weapons stored in homes could injure or cause
death to children, guests, and other family members, or cause abrupt
disorder. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.
There, New Orleans law enforcement officials went to the doors of
property owners, many of who were homeowners, to force compliance
with evacuation orders.100 Those orders required law enforcement to,
among other things, confiscate firearms for the purpose of maintaining
civility. Public officials cited significant public looting and criminal
activity in the wake of Katrina as reasons for banning possession of
firearms. The ordinance authorized law enforcement to confiscate
firearms with an authorized search warrant. Gun rights advocates
argued the very opposite, noting that stripping citizens of firearms left
families at risk of harm, injury, or death at the hands of looters, gangs,
home invaders, rapists and other criminals.101
Missing from the debate in the wake of the New Orleans firearm
ordinance was the Takings Clause. The Heller ruling, handed down soon
after Hurricane Katrina, established additional protections of firearm
possession in the “hearth and home.”102 Yet, physical seizure of firearms
possessed in the homestead, for purposes of keeping public order
during a natural disaster, may not fall as comfortably within police
powers of local governments as one would expect in light of a homecentric Takings Clause.103
100. Stephen P. Halbrook, “Only Law Enforcement Will Be Allowed to Have Guns”:
Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearms Confiscations, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 339,
339–40 (2008) (describing the confiscation order and subsequent litigation by the NRA, written
by counsel for the NRA in NRA of Am., Inc. v. Nagin, No. 05-4234 J(2), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
275 (E.D. La. 2006)).
101. Nagin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 275, at *3–*4 (issuing a consent decree following a
settlement of the NRA’s suit against the Mayor of New Orleans and the New Orleans
Superintendent of Police granting a permanent injunction against the seizure of lawfully
possessed firearms).
102. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
103. In Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), the Court of Appeals of
Indiana held that a firearm seizure and retention statute was rationally calculated to advance the
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In other words, a homebound takings doctrine places special
limitations on governments who attempt to condemn personal
property in firearms for purposes of public safety. Local governments
could conceivably, in the face of difficult doctrinal hurdles, circumvent
Second Amendment homebound restrictions on firearms by simply
physically seizing such personal property as part and parcel of its police
power. However, a home-centric takings doctrine might impose stricter
compensation requirements or heightened scrutiny when physically
taking a home or requiring the surrender and confiscation of weapons
possessed in the home in a time of emergency.
C. Firearms, the Police Power and Takings
The noncontiguous Second and Fifth Amendments raise an
interesting parallel in doctrine when read from the Court’s line of
regulatory takings precedent. In fact, some federal courts have
entertained challenges to gun possession statutes under the Takings
Clause.104 Recall Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.105
There, the Court weighed the government’s exercise of its police power
to enact laws that regulate property, and whether such a regulation,
which is usually deemed valid and permissible, inhibits property rights
to the extent that it becomes a taking without regard to the public
interest.106 In light of the state’s police power, the Court also set forth
the basis for what eventually become known as the Lucas test, which
determines if a regulation constitutes a taking by asking whether it
deprives the property owner of all economically viable use of his

legitimate governmental purpose of prohibiting the mentally ill from possessing firearms.
Therefore, it seems the statute was a valid exercise of police power and not a violation of the right
to bear arms. Id. at 836–37. In State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 676 (Ariz.
2017), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the State may constitutionally prohibit a city’s
practice, prescribed by local ordinance, of destroying firearms that the city obtains through
forfeiture or unclaimed property. In doing so, the court explained that “[r]egulation of firearms,
including their preservation or destruction . . . involves the state’s police power and is of statewide
concern.” Id. Perhaps impliedly then, if the destruction of firearms is equivalent to the taking of
firearms, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the taking of firearms, at a minimum, involves
state’s police power and is of statewide concern.
104. See, e.g., Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 869 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding law temporarily
suspending importation of assault weapons not violative of the Takings Clause). The court noted
that if it had jurisdiction to consider a takings claim, it would analyze a gun regulation under the
Penn Central per se test to determine the character of the governmental action, its economic
impact and its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations.
105. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that requiring an apartment owner to allow installation of
a cable box on the building is a taking requiring just compensation).
106. Id. at 425.
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property.107 Or, as set forth in Penn Central, whether the regulation
imposes substantial economic impact, interferes with investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the action runs afoul of the
public interest generally.108 Indeed, for example, legislation that
dispossesses an owner of a gun or capacity magazines, by forcing him
to surrender the property to law enforcement, is arguably a regulatory
taking.109 This line of reasoning is what the Court in Horne explained:
property owners “do not expect their property, real or personal, to be
actually occupied or taken away.”110 Legislation that requires a gun
owner to surrender, remove, or sell a firearm and thus deprives the
owner of possession and use of his property rights is a taking, and the
states’ police power could not be justified to circumvent the just
compensation requirement.111
The Supreme Court’s Murr ruling set forth two scenarios where
governmental regulation is so burdensome that it constitutes a taking,
noting that “with certain qualifications . . . a regulation which ‘denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land’ will require
compensation under the Takings Clause.”112 The Court proceeded to
explain that “when a regulation impedes the use of property without
depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, a taking still
may be found based on ‘a complex of factors,’ including (1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”113
Likewise, the Court further extended its logic in Horne, noting that “a
physical appropriation of property g[ives] rise to a per se taking,
without regard to other factors.”114 There, the Court found that a
physical seizure of raisins was cognizable under the Takings Clause.115

107. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
108. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (describing the Penn Central test); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127–28 (1978).
109. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (enjoining enforcement of a
California statute that restricted possession of magazines able to hold more than 10 rounds).
110. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2015) (finding that a regulation requiring
raisin growers to reserve a percentage of their raisins for the government, free of charge, and to
pay a fine for failure to obey was a taking requiring just compensation).
111. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1138–39.
112. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
113. Id. at 1943.
114. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (2015).
115. Id.
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Indeed, some federal courts have agreed that regulations requiring
surrender of guns to law enforcement to be destroyed constitutes a
taking, relying upon the precedential string of regulatory takings cases
to make the point. In Duncan v. Becerra, the Southern District of
California enjoined California from requiring persons to dispossess
themselves of lawfully-owned magazines able to hold more than 10
rounds.116 Persons could dispossess the magazines by removing them
from the State, selling them to a licensed firearm dealer, or
surrendering them to a law enforcement agency for destruction.117
Plaintiffs brought facial and as-applied challenges to the regulation,
alleging infringement of their Second Amendment right to bear arms.118
The government contended that it acted within its police powers for
public safety purposes, and that “a prohibition on possession of
property declared to be a public nuisance is not a physical taking.”119
The District Court recognized that, in accordance with Loretto,120
“whether a law effects a physical taking is ‘a separate question’ from
whether the state has the police power to enact the law.”121 And even
where the regulation “enjoin[s] a property owner from activities akin
to public nuisances,” scrutiny under the regulatory takings doctrine
may still be appropriate.122 Indeed, dispossession of guns via surrender
to the government for destruction constituted, according to the court,
a per se taking requiring just compensation.123 Further, such
dispossession via sale was infeasible because the regulation brought the
fair market value of the magazines “near zero.”124 Likewise, the court
found removal of guns from the state infeasible because it unfairly
relied upon other states that permit ownership of large capacity
magazines, and “the associated costs of removal and storage and
retrieval may render the process more costly than the fair market

116. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1139–40 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 32310).
117. Id. at 1110.
118. Id. at 1112.
119. Id. at 1136. The District Court noted that California’s designation of large capacity
magazines as a public nuisance is “dubious.” Id. at 1137.
120. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1982) (“It is a
separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights
that compensation must be paid. We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized
by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.”).
121. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425).
122. See id. (“[T]he ‘legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis
for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.’”
(internal citations omitted)).
123. Id. at 1138.
124. Id.
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value125 (if there is any) of the magazine itself.” The court, in an apt line,
noted “whatever might be the State’s authority to ban the sale or use
of magazines over 10 rounds, the Takings Clause prevents it from
compelling the physical dispossession of such lawfully-acquired private
property without just compensation.”126
A home-centric takings doctrine that tightens the Loretto test, for
example, to include any temporary invasion or occupation of the home,
may extend to regulations that “temporarily” suspend or invade gun
possession in the home. Further, a stricter Lucas test that permits
challenges to gun regulations that deprive a gun owner of less than all
economically viable use of the firearm in the home is an interesting
parallel worth noting.
However, under the prevailing home-less takings doctrine,
temporary gun suspensions in the home or elsewhere may not rise to a
regulatory taking. In Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, the government argued,
among other things, that a gun manufacturer could not “establish a
valid taking claim because . . . the Government’s temporary deprivation
of the rifles does not constitute a compensable taking.”127 The Eleventh
Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the takings claim,
but the court nonetheless entertained how such a claim might result. It
noted “that the temporary suspension does not constitute a taking”
because the state “acted in a purely regulatory capacity and does not
profit from its actions.”128 The court further noted that the state action
“neither permanently nor totally deprived [Gun South] of any property
because the Government . . . only temporarily suspended the
importation of such rifles” and that although the gun manufacturer may
have had a “reasonable investment-backed expectation, [Gun South
did] not demonstrate that the suspension will unreasonably impair the
value of the rifles.”129 Consequently, “no compensable taking . . .
occurred.”130
125. Id. at 1138. The District Court noted that the “typical retail cost of a magazine” is
between $20 and $50. Id.
126. Id. The District Court concluded that the regulation would deprive Plaintiffs “not just of
the use of their property, but of possession” as well. Id. (emphasis in original). “Without
compensation, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed as they will no longer be able to retrieve or
replace their ‘large’ capacity magazines.” Id. Accordingly, the court granted the preliminary
injunction “to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable injury under the Takings Clause.”
Id. at 1139 (emphasis in original).
127. 877 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1989).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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D. Firearms, Exactions and Permits
In a similar vein, the Court’s exactions doctrine, which requires the
state to satisfy criteria for bargains that implicate the use of land,131
could conceivably be applied in the Second Amendment context with
caution. Conditioning a permit to use property in a certain manner on
the requirement that a property owner relinquish a constitutional right
is a quintessential example of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.132 Recall Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.133 There,
the Court determined that an unlawful exaction had been exercised
when the government demanded the landowner convey an easement
across his land for a beachfront view to the public in exchange for a
building permit.134 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, likewise, withholding a
building permit on a condition that has no essential nexus or rough
proportionality to the public harm was an exaction in violation of the
Takings Clause.135 In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, the Court found that denying a development permit based on
a landowner’s refusal to accede to a wetland improvement condition
was a taking and that demanding a monetary fee in exchange for the
permit also ran afoul of the Takings Clause.136
Now, recall Heller.137 There, the D.C. ordinance banned handgun
possession of unregistered firearms and required residents keep
lawfully owned guns unloaded or bound by a trigger lock in the home.
Dick Heller’s registration application was denied because he wished to
possess his handgun in his home for protection.138 The Court found that
mandating nonfunctional firearms in the home was a total ban on
handguns in violation of the Second Amendment’s individual right to
bear arms.139 However, to read the Court’s exaction branch of its
131. Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287,
288.
132. Sullivan, supra note 39, at 1420.
133. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
134. Id. at 841–42 (“California is free to advance its ‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by
using its power of eminent domain . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it
must pay for it.”).
135. 512 U.S. 374, 394–95 (1994) (“We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies
do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the
petitioner’s proposed new building.”).
136. 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013) (“[T]he government’s demand for property from a land-use
permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government
denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”).
137. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
138. See id. at 575–76.
139. Id. at 635.
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regulatory takings doctrine from an intradoctrinal method into the
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms raises a few intriguing points.
First, can the government achieve indirectly through the Takings
Clause what it cannot do directly in the Second Amendment? Could
the government circumvent the Second Amendment’s strict scrutiny
standard by requiring the applicant to agree to dissemble or lock his
handgun in the home in exchange for the firearm permit? Such an ad
hoc exercise of the government’s police power may give rise to a
takings claim, but it arguably would survive the Court’s heightened
standard of review in exactions. Let us assume that there is an
individual right, as opposed to collective right, to bear arms and that
such a right may be realized through a lawful registration and
permitting process. Heller tells us that a total ban on functioning
firearms in the home runs afoul of the Second Amendment. Further, let
us assume that a person has a property interest in a handgun and
firearm permit, because a firearm, in and of itself, is personal property,
like a vehicle, triggering protections under the Takings Clauses.140 If the
government cannot totally ban operable firearms from a person’s
home, then the government could, arguably, be capable of achieving
that same result by demanding the owner forfeit his operable firearm
in the home in exchange for a non-operable firearm permit.
As Justice Breyer’s dissent explains, the D.C. ordinance was enacted
in part on the basis that gun-related accidents required government
regulation for purposes of public safety.141 The public harm, then, is
injury and death caused by unlocked and assembled firearms inside and
outside the home. The condition may meet the essential nexus test,
which requires a direct connection between the legitimate state interest
in saving lives and mitigating gun-related injuries and the permit
condition of requiring the applicant to agree to trigger-lock or
disassemble the firearm in the home.142 Further, such ad hoc conditions
may meet the rough proportionality test, which inquires whether the
gun restriction by a city ordinance, like the one in Heller, bears a
reasonable relationship to the projected impact of unlocked triggers
and assembled firearms in the home.143
140. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2421–22 (2015).
141. Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. See id. (“The law at issue here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, bears
a ‘rational relationship’ to that ‘legitimate’ life-saving objective.”).
143. See id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny
to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns
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But these arguments also weaken the home-centric protections
generally sought by the Court. On the contrary, reading exactions
doctrine into the Second Amendment may provide greater protections
from legislation impinging on the right to bear arms in the home. It is
equally plausible that the essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests fail when the government seeks to condition gun permits on the
owner relinquishing his right to have an operable firearm in the home,
because courts may find the health and safety concerns involving selfdefense in the home are not roughly proportional to perceived harm to
children, other family members or guests in the home.
E. Soldiers, Searches and Self-Incrimination
Drawing upon intratextual and intradoctrinal methods of
protections regarding soldiers and searches shows the Court’s
cleverness with doctrinalism when the home and privacy are
intertwined. Few provisions and amendments that adjoin each other
have the same or similar wording. But the Third and Fourth
Amendments are the Constitution’s textual “home” for protections to
homes, and, arguably, are the root of the homebound tree that has
grown into the First, Second, and Fifth Amendments. The Third
Amendment permits the forced quartering of soldiers, presumably by
an act of Congress, in houses during wartime, but not during
peacetime.144 The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, states the
“right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses,” meaning perhaps
the Third Amendment is really about property, rather than people.145
This important connection shows that both amendments “explicitly
protect ‘houses’ from needless and dangerous intrusions by
governmental officials.”146
As some argue, “[w]ith the help of the Fourth Amendment, the
Third Amendment [] constitutionalized the maxim, ‘every man’s home
is his castle[]’” and that liberty and privacy protections in the Third
“have justified the application of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”147 But the text of both
on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the
former in the course of advancing the latter.” (emphasis in original)).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
145. Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Military
Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 113, 132–33 (2005).
146. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1175 (1991).
147. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 967 (2d Cir. 1982) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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amendments could be read differently. For example, the Third
Amendment is arguably concerned with property protections rather
than privacy, as the text expressly states soldiers may not be “quartered
in any house,” whereas the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of
the people to be secure in their . . . houses.”148
Recall Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court’s major ruling on
obscenity and Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.149 There,
officers found paraphernalia hidden in the home, and without a
warrant, the Court ruled that such a search and seizure of items not
initially part of the investigation was unconstitutional.150 But Justice
Clark’s opinion offers more than just a lesson on criminal procedure
under the Fourth Amendment. He offers a clue into what the Court
makes of the “home” across several amendments.
There, he explained that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
“almost into each other” and that the Court’s doctrine in both
amendments “applies to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.”151 He further explained that “[i]t is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property[.]”152 Here, Justice Clark
commingles the Fifth Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination
in the “home” with the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
warrantless searches and seizures in the “home.” The link drawn by
Justice Clark offers a window for which we can have greater
appreciation for how homebound doctrines across and within the Bill
of Rights seamlessly influence each other, and how the Court has often
leaned into a particular home-centric doctrine to make sense of an
adjacent or nonadjacent amendment.
Likewise, Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut is a
nod to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment’s protections of
homes.153 That case, of course, dealt with the Court’s reading of an anticontraception statute as a violation of a person’s right to marital
148. Wyatt, supra note 145, at 132 (internal quotations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
III, IV.
149. 367 U.S. 643 (1965).
150. See id. at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
151. Id. at 646 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
152. Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
153. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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privacy and the broader privacy right involving intimate practices.154
The Court in Griswold built upon prior privacy cases to establish a
general right to protection from government intrusion into private
spaces, such as the home.155 Justice Douglas quotes “houses” in both
the Third and Fourth Amendment, but failed to explain how the
sanctity of the home could be used to “signal the special sanctity of
bedrooms.”156
But the Court did not stop at the adjoining nature of the house in
the Third and Fourth Amendments. Justice Douglas also drew upon the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to explain the
majority’s decision, asking: “[w]ould we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?”157 By linking the “houses” in the Third and Fourth,
Douglas made the intradoctrinal leap by pulling from the Fifth
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause to solidify his argument for
privacy protections in a bedroom regarding conception. Indeed,
Douglas utilized the penumbra of homebound “emanations” in other
amendments to strengthen the majority’s reliance upon an
unenumerated justification to strike down the Connecticut statute.
F. Soldiers and Takings
Juxtaposing the nonadjoining Third and Fifth Amendments
presents a unique thematic association between two provisions that
directly involve property. There are “few scholars [who] have noted the
similarities between” these amendments.158 Textually, the Third and the
Fifth Amendment could plausibly be read into each other, as the Third
may be the “first cousin to the Fifth.”159 But the Third Amendment’s
“absence from the Takings Clause debate is striking.”160 Both
amendments tend to break down along property and liability rules.161

154. Id. at 485.
155. See id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
156. See Akhil Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1774 (2011).
157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485
158. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis
of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 n.58 (2005).
159. Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 131 n.120 (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 208 F.R.D. 148, 151–52 (W.D. Tex. 2001)).
160. Id. at 122.
161. Kontorovich, supra note 158, at 1162.
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The Fifth prohibits taking private property unless for public use (a
property rule) and requires just compensation (a liability rule).162 The
Third, on the other hand, prohibits quartering soldiers in a person’s
home (a property rule) during peacetime (a liability rule).163 Thus, it is
plausible to read the protections afforded under the Third into the
Fifth.
From a historical perspective, the Third Amendment was arguably
focused on quelling military oppression, which can be interpreted to
mean that the “home deserved special protection from government
intrusion” and that, likewise, it is “possible that the Framers intended
[the Takings Clause]” to provide greater protection to the home than
other types of property.164 In other words, one might stretch the text of
both the Third and Fifth Amendments, especially the Takings Clause
protection of “private property,” to “implicitly” mean protections to
the home.165 This is plausible. Read together, the Third and Fifth
(especially a homebound Takings Clause) might offer special
protections to homes given the continued constitutional “solicitude for
the home.”166 But without a homebound limitation in the Court’s
takings jurisprudence, it is plausible that the military could, if it wanted,
circumvent the peacetime protections in the Third Amendment by
condemning homes to quarter officers and paying just compensation.167
But if a homebound limitation were acknowledged in takings, then such
maneuvering would be more difficult. And what about the physical
occupation of soldiers in homes during peacetime or wartime?
Recall Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.168 There, the
Court set forth its per se takings test involving physical occupations of
private property. The intruder, of course, was not a soldier seeking
refuge during peacetime. Instead, it was a cable company authorized by
statute to affix cable boxes to walls.169 In light of Loretto, which for
many was an unsatisfactory ruling that left gaps in logic (what about
mailboxes or water meters?), does quartering soldiers qualify as a
taking, and if so, is it merely a partial taking? The Court’s takings
162. Id. at 1161.
163. Id. at 1164.
164. Sprankling, supra note 159, at 131.
165. Id. at 132.
166. Id.
167. Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 117, 146–47 (1993).
168. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that requiring an apartment owner to allow installation of
a cable box on the building is a taking requiring just compensation).
169. Id. at 421.
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jurisprudence leaves the door open to the argument that quartering
soldiers, even temporarily, may be an unlawful intrusion requiring
compensation under the Third, if not simultaneously the Fifth.170 The
question, of course, is whether the soldiers are temporarily or
permanently “affixed” to the home. It is unclear whether that matters,
as any invasion into the home, regardless of time horizons, arguably
requires a remedy for the physical imposition.
Indeed, quartering may qualify as a taking requiring just
compensation.171 For example, quartering soldiers in a person’s home
is a “specific type of partial taking” because the “owner’s occupancy of
the property is limited and its value reduce[d]” while at the same time
the owner retains fee simple ownership and still, to some degree,
benefits from the property and will, at some point, take back full
possession.172 This, one may argue, would be a quintessential regulatory
taking not requiring just compensation.173 The result might be that the
Third Amendment “provides [the] benchmark for regulatory takings”
where claims of takings must give rise to a “much more severe
deprivation” of private property than the quartering of troops.174
If the Third Amendment, under this conception, were to morph into
a secondary takings clause of sorts, then it seems to elevate the
quartering of soldiers as a “special class of taking” that requires a
homeowners’ consent.175 Such consent gives homeowners a heightened
sense of property interest because they can protect the home and
personal possessions more than other types of property.176 In other
words, the Third Amendment arguably presents a special property
interest in the home because the provision “gives the owner of any
‘house’ (and presumably not nonresidential property) the right to
refuse to quarter soldiers during peacetime.”177 However, the Takings
Clause, regardless of a focus on home protections, would restrict the
military by prohibiting the institution from denying or disparaging “a
homeowner’s right to receive just compensation for a public taking.”178
170. Bell, supra note 167, at 146–47 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
171. Id. at 148.
172. See Kontorovich, supra note 158, at 1168 (“The Supreme Court has described similar
governmental action as a regulatory taking that does not require compensation.”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Bell, supra note 167, at 147.
176. William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the
Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 n.8 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Bell, supra note 167, at 148.
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G. Searches and Physical Occupations
Scholars note that the “[t]he most sacred of all areas . . . is the home”
under the Fourth Amendment”179 and that such a locus is the “gold
standard” for Fourth Amendment protections.180 Such protections
extend beyond the typical owner-occupied “houses” to residential
dwellings broadly, including temporary dwellings, hotels, boarding
places, and long-term hospital rooms.181 Linda McClain explains:
“jurists often use [the] maxim[s] [of ‘castle’ and ‘fortress’] to explain
the political and historical significance of the Fourth Amendment,
which purposely focuses protections on the ‘inviolability of the inside’”
of the locus.182 And though the privacy concerns embedded in the
Court’s home-centric Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are legion,
there also persists a property-centric conception of the Fourth
Amendment.183 As Orin Kerr explains, though the text of the
Amendment states “reasonable expectation of privacy,” that
expectation is realized by the right to exclude, which permits the owner
to retreat into his own home for safety and security from government
intrusion.184
The rights entrenched under the Fourth Amendment also tend to
“track the right to exclude others” by first having rights of occupation,
ownership, leasehold interests, or other tenancy rights that give rise to
a legal right to exclude.185 As Stephanie Stern explains, the “home
protection is not absolute and there are chinks in the doctrinal armor”
that reveal a “double-edged sword of housing exceptionalism’s
property” focus, including lesser privacy protections in trespass or
squatting cases, protective sweeps after arrest, or the plain-view seizure
doctrine giving law enforcement power to seize evidence observed

179. Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the
Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997).
180. Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and
Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV 1, 7–8 (2009).
181. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL. L. REV. 905, 913 n.31 (2010); see also United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d
673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 202 (1995).
183. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–19 (2004) (“[A] strong and
underappreciated connection exists between the modern Fourth Amendment and real property
law.”).
184. Id. at 809–10.
185. Id. at 811.
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outside the home.186 But as Stern recognizes, even in light of these
chinks, the home still receives stronger protections under the Fourth
than other property interests, such as commercial buildings,
automobiles, and public spaces and places, giving rise to a “bizarre”
pattern of privacy protection exceptions that, in some circumstances,
require probable cause for searches of curtilage but reasonable
suspicion for strip searches in schools.187 It is clear that though the
Fourth Amendment protects the house in some way, shape or form, the
Court’s jurisprudence is mainly focused on the privacy protections of a
person to be secure in the home from unreasonable searches and
seizures.188
Yet, with the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause adjoined, one can find useful interconnections between
the two provisions. For example, Amar writes that the Court could
plausibly “use the Fourth Amendment to craft special rules when the
government tries to ‘seize’ a ‘house.’”189 Such protections run the other
way. The Court’s takings jurisprudence, especially regulatory takings,
could be utilized to offer greater protections and remedies to unlawful
and even lawful searches and seizures.
To force a person to submit to some physical occupation of his land
is conceivably the same as forcing onto a person’s home and residence
the entrance of government agents for purposes of search and
seizure.190 The difference is that though homeowners are compensated
for the forcible taking, they “are not compensated for the government’s
use of the physical space of the home” during a search.191 As a result, a
unique takings claim is plausible where the Court employs its takings
analysis in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides for a
“compensable intrusion.”192
This argument, however, runs into some doctrinal difficulty in light
of the Court’s Katz decision holding that the Fourth Amendment is
about privacy rights and its protections do not attach to “places,” but
rather “people.”193 Privacy conceptions of unenumerated rights is
simply insufficient, especially because the Fourth Amendment
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Stern, supra note 181, at 917–18.
Id. at 918.
See Amar, supra note 156, at 1771; see also Sprankling, supra note 159, at 123 n.68.
See Amar, supra note 156, at 1777.
See Kelly, supra note 180, at 6–7.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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protections were once focused on places, not people.194 The Court’s
post-Katz search and seizure doctrine still entails elements focused on
property protections. It is arguably a flawed doctrine because it focuses
too much on the residential property, specifically the home.195 Still,
“while the Fourth Amendment turns a blind eye to the costs incurred
by legitimate searches, the care for individuals’ property embodied in
the Takings Clause helps to illustrate” why the blindness may be
unjust.196 Whether homeowners “should be compensated regardless of
whether the search was warranted or reasonable” under the Takings
Clause is a question that a court might entertain.197
CONCLUSION
This Article engaged with textual and doctrinal facets of
homebound protections in the Bill of Rights. Coherence theory adds a
dimension to the Supreme Court’s Bill of Rights doctrine. That is, the
Court could entertain a homebound doctrinal and textual thread of
protections across the Bill of Rights that would extend from smut to
takings. What we find by exercising this hybrid interpretive
methodology combining both intratextualism and intradoctrinalism is
clarity, coherence, and consistency when the Takings Clause is viewed
in a similar home-centric vein as its adjoining and non-adjoining
amendments in the Bill of Rights. This methodological exercise also
reveals intriguing patterns of related protections between different
homebound Bill of Rights protections to the home, while at the same
time exposing deeper thematic associations of protections to the home
within and across the Bill of Rights and providing normative ways to
expand protections to the home.

194.
195.
196.
197.

Stern, supra note 181, at 907; see also Kerr, supra note 183, at 809–27.
Stern, supra note 181, at 907.
Kelly, supra note 180, at 3.
Id.

